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Abstract 
We examine the effects of greenfield FDI and cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) on total factor productivity (TFP) in developed and developing host countries of 
FDI. Using panel data for up to 123 countries over the period from 2003 to 2011, we find that 
greenfield FDI has no statistically significant effect on TFP while M&As have a positive 
effect on TFP in the total sample. Greenfield FDI and M&As both appear to be ineffective in 
increasing TFP in the sub-sample of developing countries. In contrast, M&As have a strong 
and positive effect on TFP in the sub-sample of developed countries. 
 
Keywords: greenfield FDI; cross-border mergers and acquisitions; total factor productivity 
JEL codes: F21; F23; O47 
 
                                                     

* We are grateful to an anonymous referee and the editor, Richard Kneller, for many helpful 
suggestions and constructive comments. 
2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the so-called Monterrey Consensus agreed at the UN summit on 
Financing for Development in 2002, foreign direct investment (FDI) “is especially important 
for its potential to transfer knowledge and technology, create jobs, boost overall productivity, 
enhance competitiveness and entrepreneurship, and ultimately eradicate poverty through 
economic growth and development” (United Nations, 2003: 9). This may explain why 
policymakers in various host countries compete fiercely for FDI inflows, even though the 
empirical evidence on the effects of FDI on economic growth and factor productivity is rather 
mixed.
1
  
Empirical findings could be inconclusive since macroeconomic studies typically rely 
on overall FDI inflows and do not disaggregate FDI by type and mode of entry. Policymakers 
seem to prefer so-called greenfield FDI over mergers and acquisitions (M&As).
2
 Blomström 
and Kokko (2003) observe that policymakers compete mainly for greenfield FDI by offering 
subsidies and incentives. The survey of voters in the United States by Jensen and Malesky 
(2010) shows that this incentive-based competition provides “a useful tool for politicians to 
win reelection.” It appears that voters clearly reward politicians for attracting new investment 
projects. By contrast, the chances for reelection are unlikely to improve in the case of M&As. 
UNCTAD (2000: 159) observes that “concerns are expressed in political discussions and the 
media in a number of host countries that acquisitions as a mode of entry are less beneficial for 
economic development than greenfield investment, if not positively harmful.” Greenfield FDI 
is typically perceived to create new capital assets and additional production capacity, whereas 
                                                     
1
 Prominent studies include Borensztein el al. (1998), Carkovic and Levine (2005), Alfaro et al. (2004; 2009), 
and Woo (2009). Görg and Greenaway (2004) conclude that the evidence on spillovers from foreign to local 
firms is mixed. 
2
 Greenfield FDI means that foreign investors establish new entities by setting up plants and factories from 
scratch, whereas the M&A mode of entry means that existing firms are taken over by foreign investors. See also 
Section 3.b. 
3 
cross-border M&As only involve a change from local to foreign ownership of existing assets 
and production capacity.  
This dichotomy may be overly simplistic, as we discuss in Section 2. However, the 
lack of reliable data on greenfield FDI rendered it almost impossible to assess in a convincing 
way whether M&As are less effective than greenfield FDI in promoting macroeconomic 
growth and productivity in a large sample of developing and developed countries.
3
 We 
overcome this problem by drawing on a new dataset on greenfield FDI, available from 
UNCTAD since 2003 for a large sample of host countries. We employ this dataset to compare 
the impact of greenfield FDI and M&As on total factor productivity (TFP) in developed and 
developing host countries. 
Our focus is on overall, or “macro,” TFP which is the main driver of economic growth 
in the long run (Easterly and Levine, 2001). FDI is typically assumed to affect TFP, and 
hence long-run growth, via the introduction of new and better technologies, acquisition of 
skills, and spillover effects to domestic firms. Our analysis complements the existing FDI-
productivity literature which consists mainly of firm-level studies.
4
 Studies on the impact of 
total FDI on overall TFP are scarce and inconclusive, and we are the first to evaluate and 
compare the effects of total FDI, greenfield investment, and M&As on TFP.  
We apply a dynamic panel data model to account for the dynamic process of 
productivity growth and to mitigate the problems associated with omitted variables and serial 
correlation. By performing separate estimations for the specific modes of FDI, we avoid 
multicollinearity due to the complementarities between greenfield FDI and M&As shown by 
Calderón et al. (2004). We consider two sub-samples of host countries to avoid “inappropriate 
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 The few studies analysing the growth effects of different modes of FDI approximated greenfield FDI by 
subtracting M&A sales from total FDI inflows (Calderón et al., 2004; Wang and Wong, 2009a; Harms and 
Méon, 2011). As shown in Section 4, this procedure is likely to distort empirical findings. Ashraf and Herzer 
(2014) provide an exception. They use the new dataset on greenfield FDI to assess the effects of different modes 
of FDI on domestic investment. 
4
 While these studies provide valuable insights into both the productivity of multinational firms and possible 
productivity spillovers to domestic firms, they are, by definition, unable to capture the overall effect of FDI on 
macroeconomic productivity. 
4 
pooling of wealthy and poor countries” (Blonigen and Wang, 2005). The composition of FDI 
differed considerably between the two sub-samples. M&As contributed only slightly more 
than 10 percent to the flows of both types of FDI to developing host countries throughout the 
period 2003-2011. In sharp contrast, M&As constituted the dominant FDI type for the sub-
sample of developed countries (57 percent of the inflows of both types).  
In Section 2, we review the relevant literature and derive our hypothesis that M&As 
are not necessarily inferior to greenfield FDI. We introduce the data and our estimation 
approach in Section 3. Our empirical findings are reported in Section 4. Our main result is 
that greenfield FDI has no statistically significant effect on TFP while M&As have a positive 
effect on TFP in the total sample. However, greenfield FDI and M&As both appear to be 
ineffective in increasing TFP in developing countries. In contrast, M&As have a strong and 
positive effect on TFP in developed countries. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
As indicated in the Introduction, the “overall enthusiasm about FDI” (Harms and 
Méon, 2011: 2) contrasts strikingly with widespread concerns that M&As as a major mode of 
entry are “less beneficial for economic development …, if not positively harmful” 
(UNCTAD, 2000: 159). On closer inspection of the relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature it appears that both perceptions are unlikely to hold, notably when taking into 
account that the chances to benefit from different modes of FDI may vary considerably 
between developed and developing host countries of FDI. 
First of all, previous research suggests that positive effects of FDI on economic 
growth and productivity cannot be taken for granted. Theoretically, FDI is expected to 
increase productivity in the host country primarily through the transfer of advanced 
technological and managerial knowledge (Caves, 1974; de Melo, 1997). FDI is also assumed 
5 
to intensify competition; i.e., foreign firms put pressure on domestic competitors to adopt 
product and process innovations which increases their productivity compared to a situation 
without FDI. However, Aghion et al. (2008) present a Schumpeterian growth model 
explaining why more FDI could have positive growth effects only where local production is 
relatively close to the technological frontier, whereas growth is left unchanged or even 
reduced where local producers lack absorptive capacity since they lag too far behind the 
technological frontier. Findlay (1978: 2) argued in the late 1970s already that the technology 
gap “must not be too wide” for developing host countries to make use of FDI-related 
technology transfers. FDI may even reduce productivity if the entry of foreign firms crowds 
out domestic competitors (Aitken and Harrison, 1999).  
Several empirical contributions reflect these theoretical ambiguities. The regression 
results of Alfaro et al. (2004: 89) indicate that “FDI alone plays an ambiguous role in 
contributing to economic growth;” the growth effects of FDI are contingent on sufficiently 
developed local financial markets (see also Alfaro et al., 2009). Likewise, Durham (2004) 
stresses the role of financial and institutional development for the capacity of host countries to 
absorb superior technologies. The convergence regressions of Mayer-Foulkes and 
Nunnenkamp (2009) suggest that FDI helps host countries catch up with the average per-
capita income of advanced source countries only if initial income levels are already relatively 
high. According to Xu (2000), host countries must be endowed of sufficient human capital to 
benefit from technology transfers by US-based multinationals. Herzer (2012) finds that 
several factors, including primary export dependence, explain the large differences in the 
growth effects of FDI across developing host countries.
5
 This leads to our first hypothesis:  
                                                     
5
 Doucouliagos et al. (2010) perform a meta-analysis of 880 FDI-growth regressions reported in 108 studies. 
Less than half of these studies found a positive and statistically significant effect. Lipsey (2002: 55) concludes 
from an earlier review of the literature: “The size of inward FDI stocks or flows, relative to GDP, is not related 
in any consistent way to rates of growth. However, most studies find that among some subsets of the world’s 
countries, FDI, or FDI in combination with some other factor or factors, is positively related to growth.” 
6 
H1: The effects of FDI on TFP tend to be blurred when assessed for a large sample of 
developed and developing host countries. 
More closely related to the topic of different modes of FDI, UNCTAD (2000) 
provides a detailed discussion of concerns that M&As are inferior to greenfield FDI in 
promoting economic development in the host countries. The most popular concern is that 
M&As do not add to productive capacity at the time of entry and may reduce competition in 
the host country.
6
 However, M&As do add to the host country’s external financial resources, 
as does greenfield FDI, and the effects on domestic productive capacity largely depend on 
whether the released domestic resources are reinvested or consumed. UNCTAD (2000: 168) 
argues that “over the longer term, there is no reason to expect any difference in the impacts on 
capital formation of the two modes of entry.” Moreover, Calderón et al. (2004) find that 
higher M&A sales are typically followed by higher sequential FDI inflows of the greenfield 
mode.
7
 
 Models emphasizing the capacity effects of different modes of FDI entry often 
abstract from spillover effects through which foreign firms may enhance the productivity of 
domestic firms.
8
 Again, UNCTAD does not expect significant differences in the longer run in 
the degree of linkages with local firms established by either mode of FDI. Immediately after 
entry, however, M&As may involve closer links as the acquired local firm “tends to have 
stronger linkages with other firms in the economy than a new foreign entrant as it takes time 
to establish local supply relations; these linkages are likely to persist after a merger or 
acquisition and may well be strengthened” (UNCTAD, 2000: 171).  
                                                     
6
 For instance, Harms and Méon (2011: 9) note: “Our model emphasizes a particular reason why greenfield FDI 
and M&A sales may differ in their impact on growth – namely, that every dollar of greenfield FDI expands 
productive capacity, while a large share of M&A sales merely represents a rent that accrues to incumbent 
owners.” 
7
 According to Meyer and Estrin (2001: 576), many FDI projects which are formally M&As in fact resemble 
greenfield FDI: “In such ‘brownfield’ cases, the foreign investor initially acquires a local firm but almost 
completely replaces plant and equipment, labor and product line.” 
8
 This is explicitly acknowledged by Harms and Méon (2011). 
7 
Mattoo et al. (2004) develop a theoretical model to shed light on the relationships 
between the mode of FDI entry, technology transfers and market structure. The degree of 
technology transfers as well as the intensity of market competition can be regarded as two 
major factors shaping the productivity effects of FDI inflows in the host country. Both factors 
in turn depend on the mode of entry chosen by the foreign investor. Mattoo et al. (2004: 96) 
argue that the competition enhancing effect of greenfield FDI is clearly greater than that of 
M&As: “However, one mode does not unambiguously dominate the other in terms of the 
extent of technology transfer. On the one hand, the relatively larger market share that the 
foreign firm enjoys under acquisition increases its incentive for transferring costly technology 
(scale effect). On the other hand, strategic incentives to transfer technology in order to wrest 
market share away from domestic rivals can be stronger in more competitive environments 
(strategic effect).”  
Similar theoretical ambiguity prevails with regard to the diffusion of FDI-related 
managerial and technological knowledge. Given that the most efficient firms are widely 
assumed to prefer entry through greenfield FDI, the potential for knowledge diffusion appears 
to be particular large for this mode of FDI.
9
 However, the most efficient firms also have the 
strongest incentives to protect superior knowledge and avoid spillovers. Hence, knowledge 
diffusion is not necessarily smaller in the case of M&As. Technological diffusion and 
upgrading could even be faster after entry through M&As, compared to greenfield FDI: 
“M&As involve existing firms directly, albeit under new ownership, while greenfield 
investments do not. The impact of the latter on other local firms’ technology (through, e.g. 
competition and demonstration) is thus slower. Where the technological gap between foreign 
entrants and domestic firms is large, greenfield FDI may in fact drive existing domestic firms 
out of the market” (UNCTAD, 2000: 175). 
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 See Balsvik and Haller (2011: 161) and the literature on the choice of entry given there. 
8 
The few empirical panel studies addressing the economic growth effects of different 
modes of FDI cannot resolve these theoretical ambiguities. Harms and Méon (2011) find that 
greenfield FDI has a significantly positive effect on economic growth in developing host 
countries, whereas M&As have no significant effect. In contrast to Harms and Méon, the 
sample of Wang and Wong (2009a) includes developed host countries. This may explain why 
Wang and Wong find that M&As can be beneficial for host countries endowed with sufficient 
human capital. However, the estimation results of Calderón et al. (2004) suggest that growth 
precedes (i.e., Granger-causes) both types of FDI, while there appears to be no statistically 
significant reverse effect from either greenfield FDI or M&As to economic growth. All three 
studies approximate greenfield FDI by subtracting M&A sales from total FDI inflows. While 
data on greenfield FDI did not exist until recently, the limitations of treating greenfield FDI as 
a residual are well known (see UNCTAD, 2000). Consequently, the reliability of results is 
open to question at least with respect to the greenfield mode of FDI. 
Furthermore, FDI-related growth effects could be due to factor accumulation and 
expanded production capacity or improved factor productivity. Previous empirical studies 
typically do not isolate productivity effects of different modes of FDI. The country study on 
Norway by Balsvik and Haller (2011) provides a notable exception. These authors use micro 
data for Norwegian firms to assess whether greenfield FDI and M&As in the same industry 
and the same labor market region affect the productivity of domestic firms. Somewhat 
surprisingly perhaps, Balsvik and Haller (2011) find that recent entry via greenfield FDI in the 
same industry and region has a negative impact on the productivity of domestic firms, 
whereas recent entry via M&As in the same industry (though not in the same region) has a 
positive impact on the productivity of domestic firms.
10
 Some other studies using micro data 
focus on R&D activity of MNEs’ affiliates created through acquisitions or greenfield FDI. 
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 Balsvik and Haller’s (2011) explanation of this finding partly resembles the above noted reasoning of 
UNCTAD (2000). In particular, the positive productivity effects of M&As are attributed to knowledge spillovers 
in the shorter run due to pre-existing intra-industry linkages of the acquired Norwegian firms. 
9 
Bertrand et al. (2007; 2012) find that affiliates acquired by Swedish MNEs are more likely to 
engage in R&D and have a higher R&D intensity than affiliates created by greenfield FDI of 
Swedish MNEs. The authors conclude that restricting M&As in order to favor greenfield FDI 
could reduce FDI-related technology transfers to the host countries, which would constrain 
the potential for productivity enhancing spillovers.
11
 Against this backdrop, our second 
hypothesis reads: 
H2: M&As are not necessarily inferior to greenfield FDI in improving TFP in the host 
countries. 
As noted in the Introduction, M&As contribute a much larger share to total FDI flows 
in advanced host countries than in developing host countries. This could reflect that more 
advanced countries offer a larger supply of target firms with complementary domestic assets 
(Bertrand et al., 2007). At the same time, it can reasonably be assumed that M&As in 
developed host countries are largely driven by asset-seeking motives.
12
 In the theoretical 
acquisition-auction based model of Bertrand et al. (2012), several foreign investors compete 
for high-quality domestic target firms possessing important complementary local assets.
13
 
Due to competitive bidding over complementary local assets “the acquisition price is 
significantly higher than the reservation price, since the seller is then not only paid for selling 
its assets to the acquiring MNE, but also for not selling to a rival MNE” (Norbäck and 
Persson, 2007: 368). While rival non-acquirers may undertake greenfield FDI, the model of 
Bertrand et al. (2012) predicts that acquired affiliates invest more in R&D than greenfield 
affiliates. Higher sequential R&D is required to ensure that the acquisition is profitable and to 
prevent the expansion of rivals. 
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 Likewise, Belderbos (2003) finds that foreign affiliates acquired by Japanese MNEs are characterized by 
substantially higher R&D intensity than wholly-owned greenfield affiliates of Japanese MNEs. 
12
 Dunning (2000) lists strategic asset seeking FDI as one of the main types of FDI, which helps protect or 
augment the existing ownership advantages of the investing firm and/or reduce those of competing firms. 
13
 Bertrand et al. (2012) build on the model developed by Norbäck and Persson (2007). 
10 
Importantly, this reasoning applies when complementarities between the acquirer and 
local assets are strong, while it does not necessarily apply under circumstances prevailing in 
many developing countries where competition among potential acquirers for complementary 
local assets is limited or absent (Norbäck and Persson, 2007). Kim (2009) specifically refers 
to so-called fire-sale M&As under crisis conditions – such as in East Asia in the late 1990s – 
when MNEs have considerable market power in bargaining with host-country governments 
and local target firms. More generally, poor countries with narrow product and factor markets 
may have little to offer in terms of valuable local assets that are complementary to the firm-
specific advantages of potential acquirers. 
Related empirical evidence comes mainly from studies using firm-level data for 
selected OECD countries. The most notable exception is Arnold and Javorcik’s (2009) 
analysis of Indonesian micro data. Their findings contradict Kim’s (2009) skeptical 
assessment of fire-sale M&As. M&As during the period 1983-2001 improved TFP in the 
acquired Indonesian firms by 13.5 percent. This improvement is attributed to M&A-related 
restructuring: acquired firms increased investment, employment and wages and strengthened 
their world-market integration through higher exports and imports. 
 Bandick et al. (2014) evaluate the effects of foreign acquisitions on R&D intensity of 
the targeted domestic firms in Sweden. In contrast to the often feared depletion of Swedish 
R&D and its relocation to the home country of foreign acquirers, there is robust evidence that 
acquisitions lead to increasing R&D intensity in the acquired Swedish firms. Bertrand (2009) 
reports similar results for acquisitions of French firms by foreign firms.
14
 Bertrand and Zuniga 
(2006) compare the impact of purely national M&As and cross-border M&As on private 
R&D investment in OECD countries during the 1990s. In contrast to purely national M&As, 
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 The earlier study of Conyon et al. (2002), covering the period 1989-1994, shows that the labor productivity of 
UK firms which were acquired by foreign firms increased by 13 percent. In contrast, Harris and Robinson (2002) 
find some evidence that total factor productivity declined after the acquisition of UK firms by foreign firms 
during 1987-1992. 
11 
cross-border M&As in OECD host countries were associated with more R&D investment in 
relatively technology intensive industries, which appear to be more important for TFP in these 
countries than low-technology intensive industries. In summary, these findings suggest that 
cross-border M&As “may result in efficiency gains that are predominant over various costs of 
integration and market power effects” (Bertrand, 2009: 1028) – at least in relatively advanced 
countries.
15
 This invites our last hypothesis. 
H3: The chances to benefit from M&A-induced increases in TFP are higher in more 
advanced host countries. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
In this section, we present the basic empirical model and discuss some econometric 
issues (Subsection 3a). Then, we describe the data and present descriptive statistics 
(Subsection 3b). 
 
a. Basic empirical model and econometric issues 
We apply a dynamic panel data model to account for the dynamic process of 
productivity growth and to mitigate the problems associated with omitted variables and serial 
correlation. Our baseline specification is of the general form 


 
M
m
ittimitmititit XFDITFPTFP
1
1  , (1) 
where Ni ...,,2,1  is the country index, Tt ...,,2,1  is the time index, TFP represents total 
factor productivity of capital and labor, and FDI stands for three different FDI variables. The 
first is total FDI, FDItotal, measured as net inflows of FDI as a percentage of GDP—the most 
commonly used measure of FDI; the second FDI variable is greenfield investment as a 
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 As stressed by Arnold and Javorcik (2009: 43), the evidence for M&A-related increases in R&D and 
productivity of the acquired firms “cannot provide an answer to the question of how foreign ownership affects 
firms that do not receive FDI.” However, positive direct effects appear to be the precondition for FDI-related 
spillovers of superior knowledge and technology. 
12 
percentage of GDP, Greenfield; and the third FDI variable is cross-border M&As, M&A, also 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. Greenfield and M&A are the main variables of interest in 
this study. Importantly, we perform separate estimations for Greenfield and M&A to avoid 
multicollinearity due to complementarities between the specific modes of FDI (Calderón et 
al., 2004). Since some observations on net M&As and net FDI are negative for some countries 
in some years, we follow the literature and do not log-transform the FDI variables to avoid 
loss of observations. We also do not take the log of the dependent variable since there is no a 
priori reason for imposing a semi-log specification. Moreover, the Durbin-Watson statistic 
(which we report in the results tables) suggests that the linear model is more appropriate than 
the semi-log model. Nevertheless, we show in the robustness section of the paper that the 
results do not change qualitatively when total factor productivity is log-transformed.  
X is the usual vector of control variables. In the baseline model, we control for human 
capital, Humancap, population growth, Pop, and the Kaufmann–Kraay–Mastruzzi measure of 
political stability and absence of violence, Stability. In the robustness checks, we extend the 
baseline model to include trade openness, Trade, government consumption expenditures (as a 
percentage of GDP), Gov, as a proxy for distortions caused by unproductive government 
expenditures and the associated taxation (Barro, 1996; Fuentes and Morales, 2011),
16
 and 
domestic credit to the private sector (as a percentage of GDP), Credit, as a measure of 
financial development. The choice of these control variables is guided by the existing 
literature on FDI and TFP (for example, Alfaro et al., 2009; Baltabaev, 2014; Wang and 
Wong, 2009b; Woo, 2009). 
Following common practice in panel data analysis, we include fixed effects, μi, to 
control for any country-specific omitted factors that are relatively stable over time, such as 
geography and institutions. Economic institutions such as property rights lower transaction 
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 Government consumption, Gov, could thus have a negative effect on both TFP and FDI inflows. 
13 
costs by reducing uncertainty and facilitate interactions through increased stability and 
reliability, thus promoting efficient resource allocation and knowledge diffusion. Since 
institutions are likely to affect both TFP and FDI decisions, their omission would cause an 
upward bias in the estimate of the impact of greenfield FDI and M&As on TFP. As long as 
the quality of institutions is time invariant over the sample period, it will be absorbed into the 
fixed effects. To account for changes in the quality of institutions over time, we additionally 
include an index of property rights protection, Property, as a direct proxy for institutional 
quality in the vector of control variables in the robustness checks. Moreover, we use period 
dummies, λt, to account for common shocks affecting all countries in a given period. 
Examples of such shocks are global financial crises and global technological advances. 
Finally, we include lagged TFP and thus estimate a dynamic panel model. The reasons 
for using a dynamic rather than a static model are as follows: First, by including lagged TFP, 
we can explicitly account for the dynamic process of productivity growth; second, the 
inclusion of lagged TFP helps control for the effect of potentially relevant, but omitted, 
variables; and third, the lagged dependent variable also helps control for serial 
autocorrelation. While the dynamic specifications exhibit little sign of serial correlation, the 
static counterparts of equation (1) suffer from serial correlation, as we show in the empirical 
section using the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
A potential problem is that the dynamic fixed effects model may suffer from the so-
called Nickell (1981) bias; that is, the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and 
the fixed effects may bias the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable toward zero. If the 
explanatory variables are correlated with the lagged dependent variable, then the estimated 
coefficients of the explanatory variables may inherit this Nickell bias. It is well known that 
the bias decreases with T and becomes small when T is about 20 or more. Unfortunately, 
reliable data on the value of greenfield FDI projects are available only from 2003 onwards. 
14 
Thus, in the present application, the standard least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator 
may produce biased coefficients, at least for the lagged dependent variable. Indeed, there are 
alternative estimators of dynamic panel data models. Bun and Kiviet (2006) examine the 
performance of commonly used dynamic panel estimators, including LSDV, difference-
GMM, and system-GMM estimators. They conclude that none of these estimators dominates 
the others in terms of bias. We use the standard LSDV estimator, which is most commonly 
used and also yields more plausible results, as our main estimator. To ensure the robustness of 
our results we employ the Blundell and Bond (1998) system-GMM estimator. Moreover, to 
overcome any possible Nickell bias, we not only use the GMM estimator, but we also 
estimate static panel data regression models and dynamic panel data regression models 
without fixed effects. 
Another econometric issue is the potential endogeneity of the FDI variables. FDI may 
go to rich countries with high productivity, which could explain a positive correlation 
between FDI and TFP. Alternatively, to the extent that FDI is driven by international factor 
price differences, FDI may go to poor countries with low productivity and low wages, 
resulting in a negative correlation between FDI and TFP (see also Hong and Sun, 2011). To 
control for this endogeneity problem, the FDI variables are treated as endogenous in the 
GMM estimation procedure. In addition, we also present fixed-effects results using lagged 
instead of contemporaneous values of the independent variables.  
 
b. Data and descriptive statistics 
We now describe the data used in the empirical analysis. Since there is no database 
providing information on the level of TFP,
17
 we construct our TFP variable in the usual way, 
as ]/[ )1(  LKYTFP  , where Y is output, K denotes the capital stock, L stands for labor input, 
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 Although the Penn World Tables (version 8.0) report TFP growth rates and relative TFP levels (relative to the 
US), this database contains no data on the absolute level of TFP. 
15 
1  is the capital share of income, and   is the labor share of income. We assume a 
constant   of 0.6667, which can be justified as follows: First, it is common practice in the 
literature to assume and use a constant labor share of 2/3. Second, the evidence of Gollin 
(2002) suggests that the labor share is approximately constant across time and space with a 
value of about 2/3. We are aware that recent studies show a decline in the labor share since 
the 1980s in many (but not all) countries (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2013). However, and 
third, reliable data on the labor share are still lacking for many countries. This forces us to 
rely on the standard assumption of 6667.0 . It should be noted in this context that any 
time-invariant country-specific measurement error will be absorbed into the fixed effects. At 
the same time, the bias arising from temporary measurement error will be mitigated by our 
use of lagged variables as instruments in the GMM procedure. 
Output is measured by real GDP (in 2005 US$) from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 2014 online database;
18
 capital (in 2005 US$) is measured by the perpetual 
inventory method and is from the Penn World Tables (PWT) version 8.0 (Feenstra et al., 
2013);
19
 and labor input is represented by the labor force (the number of people of working 
age, defined as being from 15 to 64 years old) from the WDI 2014 online database. A better 
measure of labor input would be employment times average hours, but reliable data on 
employment and hours worked are not available for many countries, particularly developing 
countries. Therefore, we follow common practice and use instead the labor force as our 
measure of labor input (see Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader, 2007; Herzer, 2011). The combination 
of WDI labor force data and PWT capital stock data allows us to maximize the number of 
observations in our empirical analysis. In the robustness analysis, we consider alternative TFP 
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 Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
19
 Available at: http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table. 
16 
measures based on (i) employment data from the PTW8.0 and (ii) capital stock data from 
Berlemann and Wesselhöft (2012).
20
 
Data on total net FDI inflows, the value of greenfield FDI projects, and cross-border 
M&As are from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
database.
21
 It should be noted that the sum of greenfield FDI and M&As often exceeds net 
FDI inflows as reported in the balance-of-payments statistics. According to international 
reporting guidelines, FDI flows are defined as investments “involving a long-term 
relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control” (UNCTAD, 2000: 267) by the 
foreign parent company. A foreign equity capital stake of at least 10 per cent is normally 
considered as a threshold for the control of assets and influence on the management of the 
affiliate. However, UNCTAD’s M&A statistics are not fully consistent with this definition; 
they are based on information provided by Thomson Reuters and may include transactions via 
domestic and international capital markets which are normally not considered as FDI flows.
22
 
UNCTAD’s new statistics on greenfield FDI are based on information provided by fDi 
Markets of Financial Times.
23
 This source includes estimates for capital investment derived 
from algorithms when a company does not release the information. As stressed by UNCTAD, 
the data may include investments that would normally not qualify as FDI flows.
24
 
Nevertheless, the new database is clearly superior to the arbitrary procedure of treating 
greenfield FDI as a residual. In the empirical section, we alternatively define greenfield FDI 
as the difference between net FDI inflows and M&A sales to demonstrate that this practice, 
                                                     
20
 Available at: http://www.hsu-hh.de/berlemann/index_552HQnG7mehYlNnS.html. 
21
 Available at http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx. 
22
 FDI flows are recorded on a net basis for a particular year. Transaction amounts recorded in M&A statistics 
are for the time of the announcement or closure of particular deals, and the amounts are not necessarily for a 
single year (UNCTAD, 2000). 
23
 As noted before, greenfield FDI “relates to investment projects that entail the establishment of new entities 
and the setting up of offices, buildings, plants and factories from scratch” (UNCTAD, 2009: 97). 
24
 For details, see: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/wir2014chMethodNote_en.pdf; and: 
http://www.fdiintelligence.com/Landing-Pages/fDi-report-2014/The-fDi-Report-2014. 
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often applied in previous studies, leads to misleading results. We express all FDI-related 
variables as a percentage of GDP, as is common practice in the literature.  
The GDP data, as well as the data on population growth, trade openness (exports plus 
imports as a percentage of GDP), government consumption as a percentage of GDP, and 
domestic credit to the private sector as percentage of GDP are from the WDI 2014 online 
database. The Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi measure of political stability and absence of 
violence is from the Worldwide Governance Indicators project.
25
 It captures “perceptions of 
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including politically‐motivated violence and terrorism” (Kaufmann et al., 
2010: 4). To measure property rights protection, we use the property rights index from the 
Heritage Foundation;
26
 higher values of the index indicate that the country more effectively 
enforces laws that protect private property. The measure for human capital is from the 
PWT8.0, and is based on years of schooling weighted by an efficiency parameter.  
Merging data from these sources yields an unbalanced panel of up to 123 countries 
with data for the period 2003-2011. These 123 countries are listed in Table A1 (Appendix A). 
Table A.2 in Appendix B shows some summary statistics on the main variables used in the 
analysis.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, we examine the effects of total FDI, greenfield investment, and M&As 
on total factor productivity using panel techniques. We also examine whether the practice of 
subtracting M&A sales from total FDI to construct (previously unavailable) data on greenfield 
investment leads to misleading empirical results. In accordance with the objective of this 
study, the focus is on evaluating the separate effects of greenfield investment and M&As. We 
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 The data are available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. 
26
 The data are available at http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-region-country-year#top. 
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first present our baseline results (Subsection 4a) and then provide several robustness checks 
(Subsection 4b). Finally, we examine whether the results differ between developed and 
developing economies (Subsection 4c). 
a. Baseline results 
Table 1 presents our baseline results with and without control variables. In the table, 
we also report the Durbin-Watson statistic to provide a test for the presence of first-order 
serial correlation in the residuals. The Durbin-Watson statistics are always close (or equal) to 
2, suggesting no serious serial correlation. 
[Table 1] 
The signs on the coefficients of the control variables are largely as expected. Human 
capital is positively and significantly associated with TFP in all specifications. This is 
consistent with the results of a number of previous studies (for example, del Barrio-Castro et 
al., 2002; Woo, 2009; Fleisher and Zhao, 2010), while some other studies do not find a 
significant impact of human capital on TFP (for example Miller and Upadhyay, 2000; Alfaro 
et al., 2009; Baltabaev, 2014). Consistent with the findings of Pritchett (1996), Strulik et al. 
(2013), and Baltabaev (2014), we find that population growth is significantly negatively 
related to TFP. A possible explanation for this finding might be that parents substitute child 
quality for child quantity, and decide to have fewer children with more education (see Galor 
and Moav, 2002; Strulik et al., 2013). Population growth might also reduce productivity by 
worsening the health status of the population. Finally, the positive coefficients on Stability 
suggest that political stability reduces uncertainty, thus facilitating better planning and 
decision making, which translates into more efficient use of resources and higher 
productivity. 
Turning to the main variables of interest, total FDI is negatively but insignificantly 
related to TFP. This is consistent with the findings of Alfaro et al. (2009), but contradicts the 
19 
results of Woo (2009) and Baltabaev (2014). Most interestingly, while the coefficient on 
Greenfield is insignificant across the specifications presented in Table 1, the coefficient on 
M&A is positive and significant. The point estimate of the coefficient on M&A in column (6) 
implies, if viewed causally, that a one percentage point increase in the M&As to GDP ratio 
increases TFP by 0.969 units (on average). While this coefficient represents the short-run 
effect, the long-run effect can be calculated by dividing the estimated short-run coefficient by 
one minus the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, )1/(   . Thus, the long-run 
effect of M&As is 9.888. 
To evaluate the magnitude of this effect, column (7) of Table 1 reports the 
standardized long-run coefficients from the model in column (6).
27
 These coefficients imply 
that the estimated size of the effect of M&As on TFP (0.088) is about one-thirteenth that of 
human capital (1.155), about half that of population growth (0.196 in absolute value), and 
about half that of political stability (0.195). Overall, the magnitudes are not implausible. 
In Table 2, we examine whether the use of constructed data on greenfield FDI in 
earlier studies leads to misleading results. To this end, we replace the original data on 
greenfield investment (available since recently from the UNCTAD FDI database) by 
following past practice of employing the difference between net FDI inflows and M&A sales, 
labelled Greenfieldconstruct. The results (with and without control variables) in Table 2 are in 
contrast to the results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1: the coefficient on the constructed 
greenfield FDI variable has a negative sign and is significant at the 10% level. The 
implication is that the conclusions reached in studies with constructed greenfield FDI data are 
potentially flawed, as a result of measurement error. 
[Table 2] 
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 The standardized long-run coefficients are calculated by multiplying the unstandardized long-run coefficients 
by the ratio of the standard deviations of the independent and dependent variables. The standard deviation of 
TFP is 481.533; the standard deviations of the independent variables are: 4.262 for M&A, 0.544 for Humancap, 
1.571 for Pop, and 0.997 for Stability. 
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b. Robustness 
The estimates in Table 1 suggest that greenfield FDI has no effect on TFP while 
M&As have a positive effect on TFP. To check the robustness of this finding, we augment our 
baseline model with four additional control variables: trade openness (Trade), government 
consumption (Gov), financial development (Credit), and property rights protection (Property). 
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 3.  
[Table 3] 
Concerning the additional control variables, only government consumption is 
significant and has the expected negative sign while trade openness, financial development, 
and property rights protection are insignificant. Of course, one must be cautious in 
interpreting these findings given the potential multicollinearity between the explanatory 
variables. Nevertheless, the findings in Table 3 are consistent with those reported in Table 1: 
the coefficient on Greenfield is not significantly different from zero while the coefficient on 
M&A is positive and significant. 
In Table 4, we examine whether our results are robust to alternative measures of TFP. 
Columns (1) and (2) present results using the log of TFP; columns (3) and (4) report results 
using TFP calculated from employment data; and columns (5) and (6) present estimates using 
TFP calculated from capital stock data from Berlemann and Wesselhöft (2012). No matter 
which TFP measure is used, Greenfield is insignificant while M&As are significantly 
positively associated with TFP. However, given the relatively low Durbin-Watson statistics, 
the reported statistical significance levels should be viewed with some caution. Specifically, 
the Durbin-Watson statistics presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 are relatively low 
compared to the Durbin-Watson statistics presented in columns (4) and (6) of Table 1. This 
could suggest that the functional form in columns (1) and (2) is misspecified. We therefore 
prefer the unlogged form.  
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[Table 4] 
Next, we address the Nickell (1981) bias by estimating both a static fixed effects 
model and a dynamic model without fixed effects. The estimation results are presented in 
Table 5. Again, we do not find significant effects for greenfield investment. The effects of 
M&As, in contrast, appear to be statistically significant. However, the low value of the 
Durbin-Watson statistics suggests serially correlated residuals in the static models and so 
casts doubt on the results in columns (1) and (2). Even in columns (3) and (4), which do not 
control for country-specific fixed effects, the Durbin-Watson statistics are quite low. Overall, 
the Durbin-Watson statistics suggest that the dynamic fixed effects model is superior to the 
static model and the dynamic model without fixed effects. 
[Table 5] 
As an additional sensitivity analysis, we re-estimate equation (1) using the Blundell 
and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator for dynamic panels. This estimator has become 
popular in the FDI-growth literature so as to overcome the Nickell bias and to address the 
problems of endogeneity and measurement error. It combines the standard set of equations in 
first differences with suitable lagged levels as instruments, with an additional set of equations 
in levels with suitable lagged first-differences as instruments (known as GMM-style 
instruments). By adding the original equation in levels to the system and exploiting these 
additional moment conditions, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) find 
a dramatic improvement in efficiency and a significant reduction in finite sample bias 
compared with the first-differenced GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
To account for the well-known problem of too many instruments, we instrument only 
the lagged dependent variable (lagged TFP) and the variables of primary interest (Greenfield 
and M&A) with GMM-style instruments. We also collapse the instrument set; thus, the GMM 
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estimator is based on one instrument per variable instead of one instrument for each variable 
at each period.  
The system GMM results are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. Following 
common practice, we also present the Hansen-J test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen) 
and a second-order serial correlation test (AR2). As can be seen, the Hansen-J test fails to 
reject the validity of the instruments, and the second-order serial correlation test indicates that 
the errors exhibit no second-order serial correlation; it appears that the models presented in 
columns (1) and (2) models are correctly specified. 
Turning to the FDI variables, we again find an insignificant coefficient on Greenfield 
and a positive and statistically significant coefficient on M&A. Because none of the 
coefficients on the control variables are significantly different from zero in column (2), and 
also because even the system GMM estimator may suffer from weak instruments (Bun and 
Windmeijer, 2010), we find the GMM results less reliable than the LSDV results presented in 
Table 1. 
[Table 6] 
An alternative approach to address potential endogeneity concerns is to use lagged 
explanatory variables. We report the results from this exercise in columns (3) and (4) of Table 
6. Again, the coefficient on Greenfield is not significantly different from zero while the 
coefficient on the M&A variable remains significantly positive. 
 
c. Differences between developed and developing countries 
As stated in our third hypothesis, we expect that the effect of M&As on TFP is larger 
for developed than for developing countries. To investigate this, we divide our sample into 
developed and developing countries. Since our FDI variables are drawn from the UNCTAD 
FDI database, we follow the United Nations (UN) classification of developed and developing 
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(UNCTAD, 2014).
28
 Table 7 presents the results, again with and without controls for human 
capital, population growth, and political instability. 
[Table 7] 
Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient on human capital is not significant for both 
sub-samples, and the coefficient is even negative (with t-statistics of -0.79 and -0.38) for 
developed countries. However, this is consistent with some previous studies that have found 
either a negative but insignificant effect of human capital on TFP (see Baltabaev, 2014) or 
even a significant negative effect of human capital on growth (see Islam, 1995). 
Concerning our main variables of interest, it can be seen that the effect of greenfield 
investment is insignificant for both developed and developing countries, which resembles 
previous results for the overall sample. As far as M&As are concerned, we find that their 
effect is statistically significant only for developed countries, regardless of whether the 
controls are included or not. 
Recalling the different composition of FDI inflows in the two sub-samples, the 
insignificant effects of greenfield FDI in developing host countries and the significantly 
positive effects of M&As in developed host countries are of particular relevance. As concerns 
the former, our macroeconomic finding corroborates evidence from firm-level studies which 
generally do not support the view that FDI increases TFP in developing countries.
29
 While the 
need for productivity-enhancing spillovers is particularly pressing for developing host 
countries, Wooster and Diebel (2010) argue that a solid theoretical justification for the 
existence and dissemination of spillover effects does not exist for these host countries. Rather, 
several arguments have been advanced in the literature for insignificant or even negative 
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 The countries in the sub-samples of developed and developing countries are listed in Appendix A. 
29
 Contrary to the literature for developed countries, most firm-level studies for developing countries find that 
productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic firms are insignificant or even negative (Görg and Greenaway, 
2004; Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare, 2010). Wooster and Diebel (2010: 652) conclude from a meta-analysis of 
32 studies that “it is quite possible that intrasectoral spillovers from FDI in developing countries are largely 
nonexistent.” 
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productivity effects of FDI in developing countries. First, MNEs with lower marginal costs 
due to firm-specific advantages are likely to divert demand away from domestic firms which 
would then have to reduce production (Görg and Greenaway, 2004). Second, MNEs tend to 
source fewer inputs in the host country than displaced domestic firms. The reduced demand 
for local inputs would be associated with less input variety and lower productivity in the host 
country (Rodríguez-Clare, 1996). Third, limited capability for technological imitation renders 
it easier for MNEs to protect their firm-specific knowledge and, conversely, more difficult for 
domestic firms in developing host countries to reduce the distance to the technological 
frontier.
30
 
Synergies between the acquiring and the acquired firm, in combination with host 
country characteristics, help explain the positive effects of M&As in developed host 
countries. Synergies constitute “the key and most common motive” for M&As (Tampakoudis 
et al., 2012:145). In addition to economies of scale and scope, M&As are expected to allow 
for synergies related to complementarities between the merging firms. According to Vlachos 
(2012: 187), “network access to markets, products, technology, and know-how and network 
efficiency (optimization of manufacturing and supply chain resources) are the two principle 
routes for the achievement of operational synergy.” It is here that host country characteristics 
come into play. It can reasonably be assumed that developed host countries provide relatively 
favorable local conditions for productivity-increasing synergies to materialize. As noted in 
Section 2, developed host countries offer a larger supply of target firms with complementary 
factors of production (Bertrand et al., 2007). This improves the chances for M&As to increase 
productivity. In the short run, knowledge spillovers become more likely when pre-existing 
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 Several studies assessing the economic growth effects of FDI point into the same direction. Borensztein et al. 
(1998), Alfaro et al. (2004; 2009), and Wang and Wong (2009b) all find that host countries with insufficient 
absorptive capacity, in terms of weak endowment of human capital and/or poor financial market development, 
are unlikely to benefit from FDI. Insufficient human capital hinders technological learning, and underdeveloped 
financial markets hinder complementary investments required for making use of knowledge spillovers. See also 
Section 2. 
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networks and linkages are stronger. The typically high capacity of acquired firms in 
developed host countries to utilize new knowledge renders it possible that the immediate post-
acquisition period is characterized by knowledge transfers from the acquiring to the acquired 
firm, as in Bresman et al.’s (1999) case studies of M&As involving Swedish, US and UK 
firms. In the longer run, stronger complementarities of foreign and local assets tend to be 
associated with higher R&D activity of firms acquired in developed host countries (Bertrand 
et al., 2012). In a similar vein, Wang and Wong (2009a: 324) argue that “M&As can 
positively affect economic growth only when the host country reaches a sufficient level of 
human capital.” 
As noted above, our use of the term “developing country” accords with current UN 
practice. Thus, some countries, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, are classified as 
developing countries even though their per capita incomes are now among the world's highest 
and despite the fact that they are classified by the IMF (2014) as advanced economies. This is 
why we finally assess whether M&As have a positive and significant impact only in countries 
with high levels of income. To this end we include GDP per capita (from the WDI), GDPpc, 
and an interaction between GDPpc and M&A, GDPpc×M&A, in our baseline M&As 
regression. Based on the results in Table 7, we expect that the coefficient on GDPpc×M&A 
will be positive and significant while the coefficient on M&A will be negative but not 
significant. In fact, this is what we find in Table 8 (which, again, presents results with and 
without control variables). 
[Table 8] 
The results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 imply that M&As stimulate productivity 
only in countries that have reached a certain threshold level of GDP per capita. To specify the 
threshold, we first calculate the long-run coefficients of M&A and GDPpc×M&A by dividing 
the estimated short-run coefficients of M&A and GDPpc×M&A from column (2) by one 
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minus the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. The resulting long-run coefficient of 
M&A is –3.4184, and the resulting long-run coefficient of GDPpc×M&A is 0.000204. Then, 
we differentiate TFP = –3.4184M&A + 0.000204GDPpc×M&A with respect to M&A to 
obtain dTFP/dM&A = –3.4184 + 0.000204GDPpc. Finally, this equation is set equal to zero 
and solved for GDPpc. We find that the effect of M&As on TFP is positive (and statistically 
significant) when GDPpc is above 16756.86 US$. This applies (on average over the sample 
period) to 36 of the countries examined.
31
 With the exception of China (which is an upper 
middle-income country), all these countries are high-income or developed countries according 
to current World Bank classification.
32
 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Policymakers in various host countries compete fiercely for FDI inflows. At the same 
time, they typically prefer greenfield FDI over M&As. UNCTAD (2000: 159) notes that 
M&As as a mode of entry are widely perceived to be “less beneficial for economic 
development than greenfield investment, if not positively harmful.” On closer inspection it 
appears that prevailing perceptions are unlikely to hold, notably when taking into account that 
the chances to benefit from different modes of FDI may vary considerably between developed 
and developing host countries of FDI. Specifically, we hypothesize that M&As are not 
inferior to greenfield FDI in improving TFP in the host countries – while the chances to 
benefit from M&A-induced increases in TFP are higher in more advanced host countries. 
Until recently, the lack of reliable data on greenfield FDI rendered it almost 
impossible to assess our hypotheses in a convincing way for large sub-samples of developing 
and developed countries. We overcome this problem by drawing on a new dataset on 
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 The 36 countries above the threshold are Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Brunei 
Darussalam, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, China, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Macao, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Qatar, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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 See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups. 
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greenfield FDI, available from UNCTAD since 2003. Our focus is on overall, or “macro,” 
TFP in order to gain insights into how greenfield investment and cross-border M&As may or 
may not affect economic growth. In this way, we complement firm-level studies which 
provide valuable insights into the productivity of multinational firms and possible 
productivity spillovers to connected domestic firms, while they are, by definition, unable to 
capture the overall effect of FDI on macroeconomic productivity. 
In addition to considering total FDI inflows, we perform separate estimations for the 
two specific modes of FDI. Furthermore, we distinguish between developed and developing 
host countries in order to avoid “inappropriate pooling of wealthy and poor countries” 
(Blonigen and Wang, 2005). Estimating a dynamic panel data model allows us to account for 
the dynamic process of productivity growth and to mitigate the problems associated with 
omitted variables and serial correlation. 
Our empirical findings are in sharp contrast with the revealed preferences of most 
policymakers. Our main result is that greenfield FDI has no statistically significant effect on 
TFP while M&As have a positive effect on TFP in the total sample of all developing and 
developed host countries. In addition, we find that inconclusive results on the productivity 
effects of total FDI in developing countries can hardly be attributed to the aggregation of 
different modes in most previous studies. Rather, greenfield FDI and M&As both appear to be 
ineffective in increasing TFP in this sub-sample. In contrast, M&As have a strong and 
positive effect on TFP in the sub-sample of developed host countries. Specifically, we show 
that almost all developing host countries fall below the threshold level of economic 
development to benefit from M&As. 
The policy implications of our analysis are fairly sobering, in particular for developing 
host countries, corroborating previous studies which have cast into doubt the widespread 
enthusiasm about FDI (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Carkovic and Levine, 2005).  It 
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appears that, in order to benefit from FDI-induced increases in productivity through 
technological spillovers, the host countries must not lag too far behind the technological 
frontier (Findlay, 1978; Aghion et al., 2008). Hence, domestic government resources could 
probably be better spent than by offering tax incentives and outright subsidies to multinational 
enterprises with superior technological and managerial knowledge. Importantly, this 
conclusion would remain valid even if greenfield FDI differed from M&As in the short run by 
adding more to capital formation and production capacity. Such an effect is unlikely to persist 
(UNCTAD, 2000), and factor accumulation is unlikely to play a major role for growth 
(Easterly and Levine, 2001).  
The policy implications for developed host countries are more favorable, though no 
less challenging. In order to derive more benefits from inward FDI, policymakers would be 
required to fundamentally revise their current preferences and no longer oppose M&As while 
inviting greenfield FDI. Our findings clearly suggest that the productivity enhancing effects of 
M&As are not restricted to the acquired domestic firms and a narrow network of local 
suppliers, as shown by several firm-level studies. Importantly, the productivity enhancing 
effects also carry over to the macroeconomic level of developed host countries. 
 
  
29 
REFERENCES 
Abu-Qarn, A.S. and S. Abu-Bader (2007), Sources of Growth Revisited: Evidence from 
Selected MENA Countries. World Development, 35, 5, 752–771. 
Aghion, P., R. Burgess, S.J. Redding and F. Zilibotti (2008), The Unequal Effects of 
Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the Licence Raj in India. American 
Economic Review, 98, 4, 1397–1412. 
Aitken, B.J. and A.E. Harrison (1999), Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela. American Economic Review, 89, 3, 605–618. 
 Alfaro, L., A. Chanda, S. Kalemli-Ozcan and S. Sayek (2004), FDI and Economic Growth: 
The Role of Financial Markets. Journal of International Economics, 64, 1, 89–112. 
Alfaro, L., S. Kalemli-Ozcan and S. Sayek (2009), FDI, Productivity and Financial 
Development. World Economy, 32, 1, 111–135. 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991), Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 
Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic Studies, 
58, 2, 277–297. 
Arellano, M. and O. Bover (1995), Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of 
Error-Components Models. Journal of Econometrics, 68, 1, 29–51. 
Arnold, J.M. and B.S. Javorcik (2009), Gifted Kids or Pushy Parents? Foreign Direct 
Investment and Plant Productivity in Indonesia. Journal of International Economics, 
79, 1, 42–53. 
Ashraf, A. and D. Herzer (2014), The Effects of Greenfield Investment and M&As on 
Domestic Investment in Developing Countries. Applied Economics Letters, 21, 14, 
997–1000. 
Barro, R.J. (1996), Democracy and Growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 1, 1, 1–27. 
30 
Balsvik, R. and S.A. Haller (2011), Foreign Firms and Host-country Productivity: Does the 
Mode of Entry Matter? Oxford Economic Papers, 63, 1, 158–186. 
Baltabaev, B. (2014), FDI and Total Factor Productivity Growth: New Macro Evidence. 
World Economy, 37, 2, 311–334. 
Bandick, R., H. Görg and P. Karpaty (2014), Foreign Acquisitions, Domestic Multinationals, 
and R&D. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 116, 4, 1091-1115. 
Belderbos, R. (2003), Entry Mode, Organizational Learning, and R&D in Foreign Affiliates: 
Evidence from Japanese Firms. Strategic Management Journal, 24, 3, 235–259. 
Berlemann, M. and J.-E. Wesselhöft (2012), Estimating Aggregate Capital Stocks Using the 
Perpetual Inventory Method – New Empirical Evidence for 103 Countries. Helmut 
Schmidt University Working Paper 125. Hamburg: Helmut Schmidt University 
Hamburg. 
Bertrand, O. (2009), Effects of Foreign Acquisitions on R&D Activity: Evidence from Firm-
level Data for France. Research Policy, 38, 6, 1021–1031. 
Bertrand, O. and P. Zuniga (2006), R&D and M&As: Are Cross-border M&A Different? An 
Investigation on OECD Countries. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
24, 2, 401–423. 
Bertrand, O., K. Hakkala and P.-J. Norbäck (2007), Cross-border Acquisition or Greenfield 
Entry: Does it Matter for Affiliate R&D? IFN Working Paper 693. Stockholm: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics. 
Bertrand, O., K. Nilsson Hakkala, P.-J. Norbäck and L. Persson (2012), Should Countries 
Block Foreign Takeovers of R&D Champions and Promote Greenfield Entry? 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 45, 3, 1083–1124. 
31 
Blomström, M. and A. Kokko (2003), The Economics of Foreign Direct Investment 
Incentives. In: H. Herrmann and R. Lipsey (eds.), Foreign Direct Investment in the 
Real and Financial Sector of Industrial Countries. Berlin: Springer (pp.37-56). 
Blonigen, B.A., and M.G. Wang (2005), Inappropriate Pooling of Wealthy and Poor 
Countries in Empirical FDI Studies. In: T.H. Moran, E.M. Graham and M. Blomström 
(eds), Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? pp. 221–244. 
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics. 
Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1998), Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic 
Panel Data Models. Journal of Econometrics, 87, 1, 115–143. 
Borensztein, E.R., J. de Gregorio and J.-W. Lee (1998), How Does Foreign Direct Investment 
Affect Economic Growth? Journal of International Economics, 45, 1, 115–135. 
Bresman, H., J. Birkinshaw and R. Nobel (1999), Knowledge Transfer in International 
Acquisitions. Journal of International Business Studies, 30, 3, 439-462. 
Bun, M.J.G. and J.F. Kiviet (2006), The Effects of Dynamic Feedbacks on LS and MM 
Estimator Accuracy in Panel Data Models. Journal of Econometrics, 132, 2, 409–444. 
Bun, M.J.G. and F. Windmeijer (2010), The Weak Instrument Problem of the System GMM 
Estimator in Dynamic Panel Data Models. Econometrics Journal, 13, 1, 95–126. 
Calderón, C., N. Loayza and L. Servén (2004), Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment and 
Mergers and Acquisitions: Feedback and Macroeconomic Effects. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3192. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Carkovic, M. and R. Levine (2005), Does Foreign Direct Investment Accelerate Economic 
Growth? In: T.H. Moran, E.M. Graham and M. Blomström (eds), Does Foreign Direct 
Investment Promote Development? pp. 195–220. Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics. 
32 
Caves, R.E. (1974), Multinational Firms, Competition, and Productivity in Host-Country 
Markets. Economica, 41, 162, 176-193. 
Conyon, M.J., S. Girma, S. Thompson and P.W. Wright (2002), The Productivity and Wage 
Effects of Foreign Acquisition in the United Kingdom. Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 50, 1, 85–102. 
De Melo, L.R. Jr. (1997), Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries and Growth: A 
Selective Survey. Journal of Development Studies, 34, 1, 1–34. 
Del Barrio-Castroa, T., E. López-Bazoa and G. Serrano-Domingo (2002), New Evidence on 
International R&D Spillovers, Human Capital and Productivity in the OECD. 
Economics Letters, 77, 1, 41–45. 
Doucouliagos, H., S. Iamsiraroj and M. A. Ulubasoglu (2010), Foreign Direct Investment and 
Economic Growth: A Real Relationship or Wishful Thinking? Working Paper SWP 
2010/14. Geelong, Australia: Deakin University. 
Dunning, J.H. (2000), The Eclectic Paradigm as an Envelope for Economic and Business 
Theories of MNE Activity. International Business Review, 9, 2, 163–190. 
Durham, J.B. (2004), Absorptive Capacity and the Effects of Foreign Direct Investment and 
Equity Foreign Portfolio Investment on Economic Growth. European Economic 
Review, 48, 2, 285–306. 
Easterly, W. and R. Levine (2001), It’s Not Factor Accumulation: Stylized Facts and Growth 
Models. World Bank Economic Review, 15, 2, 177–219. 
Feenstra, R.C., R. Inklaar and M.P. Timmer (2013), The Next Generation of the Penn World 
Table. Available for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt. 
Findlay, R. (1978), Relative Backwardness, Direct Foreign Investment, and the Transfer of 
Technology: A Simple Dynamic Model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92, 1, 1–16. 
33 
Fleisher, B., H. Li and M.Q. Zhao (2010), Human Capital, Economic Growth, and Regional 
Inequality in China. Journal of Development Economics, 92, 2, 215–231. 
Fuentes, J.R. and M. Morales (2011), On the Measurement of Total Factor Productivity: A 
Latent Variable Approach. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 15, 2, 145–159. 
Galor, O. and O. Moav (2002), Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic Growth. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 4, 1133–1191. 
Gollin, D. (2002), Getting Income Shares Right. Journal of Political Economy, 110, 2, 458–
474. 
Görg, H. and D. Greenaway (2004), Much Ado about Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really 
Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment? World Bank Research Observer, 19, 2, 171–
197. 
Harms, P. and P.-G. Méon (2011), An FDI is an FDI is an FDI? The Growth Effects of 
Greenfield Investment and Mergers and Acquisitions in Developing Countries. 
Working paper presented at the proceedings of the German Development Economics 
Conference, Berlin. http://ideas.repec.org/f/pmo274.html. 
Harris, R. and C. Robinson (2002), The Effect of Foreign Acquisitions on Total Factor 
Productivity: Plant-level Evidence from UK Manufacturing, 1987-1992. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 84, 2, 562–568. 
Harrison, A.E. and A. Rodríguez-Clare (2010), Trade, Foreign Investment, and Industrial 
Policy for Developing Countries. In: D. Rodrik and M.R. Rosenzweig (eds.), 
Handbook of Development Economics, Vol 5. Amsterdam: Elsevier (pp. 4039-4214). 
Herzer, D. (2011), The Long-Run Relationship between Outward FDI and Total Factor 
Productivity: Evidence for Developing Countries. Journal of Development Studies, 47, 
5, 767–785. 
34 
Herzer, D. (2012), How Does Foreign Direct Investment Really Affect Developing Countries’ 
Growth? Review of International Economics, 20, 2, 396-414. 
Hong, E. and L. Sun (2011), Foreign Direct Investment and Total Factor Productivity in 
China: A Spatial Dynamic Panel Analysis. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 73, 6, 771–791. 
IMF (2011), World Economic Outlook, April 2014: Recovery Strengthens, Remains Uneven. 
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
Islam, N. (1995), Growth Empirics: A Panel Data Approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
110, 4, 1127–1170. 
Jensen, N.M. and E.J. Malesky (2010), FDI Incentives Pay – Politically. Columbia FDI 
Perspectives 26. New York: Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International 
Investment. 
Karabarbounis, L. and B. Neiman (2013), The Global Decline of the Labor Share. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 129, 1, 61–103. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
Methodology and Analytical Issues. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
5430. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Kim, Y.-H. (2009), Cross-border M&A vs. Greenfield FDI: Economic Integration and its 
Welfare Impact. Journal of Policy Modeling, 31, 1, 87–101. 
Lipsey, R.E. (2002), Home and Host Country Effects of FDI. NBER Working Paper 9293. 
Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Mattoo, A., M. Olarreaga and K. Saggi (2004), Mode of Foreign Entry, Technology Transfer, 
and FDI Policy. Journal of Development Economics, 75, 1, 95–111. 
35 
Mayer-Foulkes, D. and P. Nunnenkamp (2009), Do Multinational Enterprises Contribute to 
Convergence or Divergence? A Disaggregated Analysis of US FDI. Review of 
Development Economics, 13, 2, 304–318. 
Meyer, K.E. and S. Estrin (2001), Brownfield Entry in Emerging Markets. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 32, 3, 575–584. 
Miller, S.M. and M.P. Upadhyay (2000), The Effects of Trade Orientation and Human Capital 
on Total Factor Productivity. Journal of Development Economics, 63, 2, 399–423. 
Nickell, S. (1981), Biases in Dynamic models with Fixed Effects. Econometrica, 49, 6, 1417–
1426. 
Norbäck, P.-J. and L. Persson (2007), Investment Liberalization – Why a Restrictive Cross-
border Merger Policy Can be Counterproductive. Journal of International Economics, 
72, 2, 366–380. 
Pritchett, L. (1996), Population Growth, Factor Accumulation, and Productivity. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 1567. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Rodríguez-Clare, A. (1996), Multinationals, Linkages, and Economic Development. 
American Economic Review 86, 4, 852-873. 
Strulik, H., K. Prettner and A. Prskawetz (2013), The Past and Future of Knowledge-based 
Growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 18, 4, 411–437. 
Tampakoudis, I.A., D.N. Subeniotis and I.M. Eleftheriadis (2012), Motives, Empirical 
Results, and Contemporary Issues in Mergers and Acquisitions. In: A. Bitzenis, V.A. 
Vlachos and P. Papadimitriou (eds.), Mergers and Acquisitions as the Pillar of 
Foreign Direct Investment. New York: Palgrave (pp. 141-157). 
UNCTAD (2000), World Investment Report 2000: Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions 
and Development. New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
36 
UNCTAD (2009), Training Manual on Statistics for FDI and the Operations of TNCs. 
Volume I: FDI Flows and Stocks. New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
UNCTAD (2014), World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan. 
New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
United Nations (2003), Financing for Development. Monterrey Consensus of the International 
Conference on Financing for Development. http://www.un.org/esa 
/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf. 
Vlachos, V.A. (2012), A Survey of Recent Literature on the Determinants of Cross-border 
Mergers and Acquisitions Activity. In: A. Bitzenis, V.A. Vlachos and P. 
Papadimitriou (eds.), Mergers and Acquisitions as the Pillar of Foreign Direct 
Investment. New York: Palgrave (pp. 159-194). 
Wang, M. and M.C.S. Wong (2009a), What Drives Economic Growth? The Case of Cross-
Border M&A and Greenfield FDI Activities. Kyklos, 62, 2, 316–330. 
Wang, M. and M.C.S. Wong (2009b), Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: The 
Growth Accounting Perspective. Economic Inquiry, 47, 4, 701–710. 
Windmeijer, F. (2005), A Finite Sample Correction for the Variance of Linear Efficient Two-
Step GMM Estimators. Journal of Econometrics, 126, 1, 25–51. 
Woo, J. (2009), Productivity Growth and Technological Diffusion through Foreign Direct 
Investment. Economic Inquiry, 47, 2, 226–248. 
Wooster, R.B. and D.S. Diebel (2010), Productivity Spillovers from Foreign Direct 
Investment in Developing Countries: A Meta-Regression Analysis. Review of 
Development Economics 14, 3, 640–655. 
Xu, B. (2000), Multinational Enterprises, Technology Diffusion, and Host Country 
Productivity Growth. Journal of Development Economics, 62, 2, 477–493. 
 
37 
 
APPENDIX A 
COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE, 2003-2011 
[Table A.1] 
 
APPENDIX B 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
[Table A.2] 
 
38 
TABLE 1 
Baseline Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Standardized 
long-run 
coefficients 
Lagged TFP 0.830*** 
(20.59) 
0.849*** 
(25.04) 
0.856*** 
(26.19) 
0.860*** 
(24.21) 
0.896*** 
(30.96) 
0.902*** 
(29.08)  
FDItotal –0.415 
(–1.33) 
–0.396 
(–1.23)      
Greenfield 
  
0.029 
(0.57) 
0.027 
(0.80)    
M&A 
    
0.794** 
(2.46) 
0.969*** 
(4.40) 
0.088 
 
Humancap 
 
120.166*** 
(3.05)  
97.161** 
(2.57)  
100.198** 
(2.13) 
1.155 
 
Pop 
 
–6.868*** 
(–2.70)  
–8.218*** 
(–4.30)  
–5.903*** 
(–2.92) 
–0.196 
 
Stability 
 
8.496** 
(2.48)  
8.690** 
(2.41)  
9.193** 
(2.03) 
0.194 
 
Durbin-Watson 1.68 1.68 1.59 1.76 1.93 2.00  
R-squared 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998  
No. of obs. 976 892 927 854 715 676  
No. of countries 123 113 123 113 123 113  
Notes: 
(i) The dependent variable is TFP.  
(ii) Coefficients for country and time fixed effects are not reported. 
(iii) Column (7) reports standardized long-run coefficients from the regression in column (6).  
(iv) t-statistics (calculated with robust White-Huber standard errors) are in parenthesis. 
(v) *** (**) indicate significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
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TABLE 2 
Results based on Constructed Data on Greenfield FDI 
 (1) (2) 
Lagged TFP 0.882*** 
(25.63) 
0.886*** 
(22.87) 
Greenfieldconstruct –0.790* 
(–1.79) 
–0.847* 
(–1.96) 
Humancap 
 
109.839** 
(2.23) 
Pop 
 
–5.080** 
(–2.37) 
Stability 
 
8.904* 
(1.90) 
Durbin-Watson 1.83 1.87 
R-squared 0.998 0.998 
No. of obs. 715 676 
No. of countries 123 113 
Notes:  
(i) The dependent variable is TFP.  
(ii) Coefficients for country and time fixed effects are not reported.  
(iii) t-statistics (calculated with robust White-Huber standard errors) are in parenthesis.  
(iv) *** (**) [*] indicate significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.  
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TABLE 3 
Additional Control Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged TFP 0.861*** 
(24.29) 
0.865*** 
(26.32) 
0.849*** 
(27.14) 
0.839*** 
(30.51) 
0.905*** 
(27.56) 
0.898*** 
(28.67) 
0.873*** 
(25.04) 
0.864*** 
(28.25) 
Greenfield 0.0273 
(0.80) 
0.040 
(0.83) 
0.045 
(0.84) 
0.035 
(0.51)     
M&A 
    
0.982*** 
(4.64) 
0.969*** 
(4.50) 
0.936*** 
(4.59) 
0.981*** 
(5.71) 
Humancap 98.717** 
(2.58) 
105.096** 
(2.54) 
97.293** 
(2.32) 
83.214** 
(2.09) 
108.597** 
(2.26) 
114.558** 
(2.38) 
111.421** 
(2.22) 
85.083** 
(1.99) 
Pop –8.282*** 
(–4.83) 
–7.412*** 
(4.34) 
–7.178*** 
(–3.98) 
–7.286*** 
(–3.82) 
–6.310*** 
(–3.13) 
–5.120*** 
(–2.31) 
–4.568* 
(–1.66) 
–4.571* 
(–1.69) 
Stability 9.596** 
(2.51) 
9.448** 
(2.48) 
10.186*** 
(2.62) 
11.587*** 
(2.85) 
11.598*** 
(2.74) 
12.507*** 
(3.02) 
12.904*** 
(3.09) 
14.0084*** 
(3.19) 
Trade –0.006 
(–0.24) 
0.080 
(0.93) 
0.056 
(0.55) 
–0.011 
(–0.10) 
0.077 
(0.73) 
0.098 
(0.92) 
0.108 
(0.84) 
0.070 
(0.57) 
Gov 
 
–1.857** 
(–2.23) 
–2.513*** 
(–3.14) 
–2.413*** 
(–3.68)  
–2.056** 
(–2.21) 
–2.863*** 
(–2.69) 
–2.348*** 
(–2.79) 
Credit 
  
–0.186 
(–0.93) 
–0.191 
(–0.95)   
–0.263 
(–1.65) 
–0.272* 
(–1.69) 
Property 
   
–0.0001 
(–0.00)    
0.064 
(0.38) 
Durbin-
Watson 1.76 1.78 1.81 1.92 2.01 2.00 1.98 2.15 
R-squared 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 
No. of obs. 839 824 798 771 671 668 650 637 
No. of 
countries 112 112 112 109 112 111 111 109 
Notes: 
(i) The dependent variable is TFP.  
(ii) Coefficients for country and time fixed effects are not reported.  
(iii) t-statistics (calculated with robust White-Huber standard errors) are in parenthesis. 
(iv) *** (**) [*] indicate significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
TABLE 4 
Alternative Definitions of TFP 
 
TFP in logs 
 
TFP based on employment 
data 
TFP based on different 
capital stock data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged TFP 0.768*** 
(19.34) 
0.827*** 
(22.90) 
0.862*** 
(29.25) 
0.892*** 
(29.36) 
0.836*** 
(12.82) 
0.878*** 
(13.36) 
Greenfield –0.00005 
(–0.60)  
0.022 
(1.03)  
0.024 
(0.40)  
M&A 
 
0.0003** 
(2.08)  
0.346*** 
(3.62)  
1.071*** 
(3.34) 
Humancap 0.200*** 
(2.70) 
0.177** 
(2.14) 
31.902 
(1.65) 
30.903 
(1.22) 
142.720** 
(2.58) 
131.285** 
(2.10) 
Pop –0.004 
(–1.17) 
–0.001 
(–0.34) 
–7.274*** 
(–5.09) 
–5.982*** 
(–4.79) 
–7.325 
(–0.91) 
–7.086 
(–0.71) 
Stab 0.026*** 
(3.36) 
0.015 
(1.11) 
3.993** 
(2.10) 
2.751 
(1.20) 
16.892*** 
(2.81) 
19.974*** 
(3.19) 
Durbin-Watson 1.59 1.49 1.59 1.69 1.57 1.77 
R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 
No. of obs. 854 676 854 676 637 536 
No. of countries 113 113 113 113 82 82 
Notes:  
(i) The dependent variable is TFP. 
(ii) Coefficients for country and time fixed effects are not reported.  
(iii) t-statistics (calculated with robust White-Huber standard errors) are in parenthesis.  
(iv) *** (**) indicate significance at the 1% (5%) level.   
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TABLE 5 
Static Model and Dynamic Model without Fixed Effects 
 Static model Dynamic model without fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged TFP 
  
0.981*** 
(211.14) 
0.978*** 
(194.09) 
Greenfield 0.059 
(0.36)  
0.021 
(0.85)  
M&A 
 
0.707*** 
(2.69)  
0.496** 
(2.11) 
Humancap 354.336** 
(2.37) 
392.127** 
(2.19) 
2.605 
(0.95) 
6.275** 
(1.98) 
Pop -10.857 
(-1.33) 
5.953 
(0.95) 
-2.751** 
(-2.54) 
-0.620 
(-0.88) 
Stab 26.481** 
(2.53) 
26.210** 
(1.97) 
1.275 
(1.26) 
2.095 
(1.63) 
Country-fixed effects  yes yes no no 
Durbin-Watson 0.57 0.60 1.37 1.41 
R-squared 0.993 0.993 0.997 0.997 
No. of obs. 958 750 854 676 
No. of countries 113 113 113 113 
Notes: 
(i) The dependent variable is TFP. 
(ii) Coefficients for country and time fixed effects are not reported.  
(iii) t-statistics (calculated with robust White-Huber standard errors) are in parenthesis. 
(iv) *** (**) indicate significance at the 1% (5%) level.  
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TABLE 6 
GMM Results and LSDV Results using Lagged Values of all Right-hand side Variables 
 GMM Lagged variables 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
Lagged TFP 0.182 
(0.97) 
0.873*** 
(6.26) 
0.847*** 
(20.04) 
0.891*** 
(20.92) 
Greenfield [lagged in column (4)] 0.163 
(1.49)  
-0.007 
(-0.08)  
M&A [lagged in column (5)] 
 
1.626*** 
(2.99)  
1.556*** 
(3.73) 
Humancap [lagged in columns (4) and (5)] 2536.462*** 
(3.06) 
-283.581 
(-1.02) 
90.398** 
(2.44) 
81.538 
(1.62) 
Pop [lagged in columns (4) and (5)] -19.253* 
(-1.97) 
-27.663 
(-0.69) 
-4.475*** 
(-3.19) 
-6.021** 
(-2.05) 
Stability [lagged in columns (4) and (5)] 49.311 
(0.43) 
224.685 
(1.20) 
1.817 
(0.46) 
4.823 
(0.80) 
Hansen (p-value) 0.167 0.336   
AR2 (p-value) 0.292 0.106   
Number of instruments 22 25   
Durbin-Watson   1.66 1.75 
R-squared   0.998 0.998 
No. of obs. 725 676 850 666 
No. of countries 113 113 113 113 
Notes:  
(i) The dependent variable is TFP.  
(ii) Coefficients for country and time fixed effects are not reported.  
(iii) We use the Windmeijer (2005) correction procedure to employ robust standard errors for the 
GMM procedure.  
(iv) t-statistics are in parenthesis.  
(v) The t-values presented in columns (4) and (5) are based on robust White-Huber standard errors. 
(vi) *** (**) [*] indicate significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
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TABLE 7 
Results for Developed and Developing Countries 
 Developing countries Developed countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged TFP 0.824*** 
(14.47) 
0.843*** 
(12.71) 
0.899*** 
(13.61) 
0.968*** 
(14.80) 
0.846*** 
(25.42) 
0.833*** 
(23.17) 
0.863*** 
(30.13) 
0.846*** 
(25.91) 
Greenfield  0.026 
(0.48) 
0.030 
(0.83)   
–0.162 
(–0.52) 
–0.264 
(–0.83)   
M&A 
  
–0.084 
(–0.62) 
0.090 
(0.15)   
0.988*** 
(5.33) 
1.053*** 
(6.50) 
Humancap 
 
25.223 
(0.55)  
51.596 
(0.79)  
–45.589 
(–0.79)  
–22.863 
(–0.38) 
Pop  
 
–9.134*** 
(–4.33)  
–8.255*** 
(–2.94)  
–7.499 
(–1.22)  
–4.175 
(–0.62) 
Stability 
 
0.499 
(0.22)  
–1.631 
(–0.45)  
34.375*** 
(4.03)  
34.735*** 
(4.44) 
Durbin-
Watson 1.36 1.60 1.60 1.77 1.82 1.84 2.00 2.02 
R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 
No. of obs. 640 571 438 403 287 282 277 272 
No. of 
countries 87 77 87 77 36 36 36 36 
Notes:  
(i) The dependent variable is TFP.  
(ii) Coefficients for country and time fixed effects are not reported.  
(iii) t-statistics (calculated with robust White-Huber standard errors) are in parenthesis.  
(iv) *** indicate significance at the 1% level.  
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TABLE 8 
Interaction-term Regressions 
 (1) (2) 
Lagged TFP 0.898*** 
(33.58) 
0.902*** 
(33.91) 
M&A -0.392 
(-1.14) 
-0.335 
(-0.49) 
Humancap 
 
121.644** 
(2.09) 
Pop 
 
-6.383*** 
(-2.74) 
Stability 
 
9.417** 
(2.08) 
GDPpc 0.0003 
(0.45) 
0.0006 
(0.71) 
GDPpc × M&A 0.00002*** 
(4.48) 
0.00002** 
(2.25) 
Durbin-Watson 1.95 2.00 
R-squared 0.998 0.998 
No. of obs. 715 676 
No. of countries 123 113 
Notes:  
(i) The dependent variable is TFP.  
(ii) Coefficients for country and time fixed effects are not reported.  
(iii) t-statistics (calculated with robust White-Huber standard errors) are in parenthesis.  
(iv) *** (**) indicate significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
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TABLE A.1 
List of Countries and their Classification 
Angola 1 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1 Latvia 2 Portugal 2 
Argentina 1 El Salvador 1 Lebanon 1 Qatar 1 
Australia 2 Equatorial Guinea 1 Liberia 1 Romania 2 
Austria 2 Estonia 2 Lithuania 2 Rwanda 1 
Bahamas, The 1 Ethiopia 1 Luxembourg 2 Saudi Arabia 1 
Bahrain 1 Fiji 1 Macao SAR, China 1 Senegal 1 
Bangladesh 1 Finland 2 Madagascar 1 Sierra Leone 1 
Barbados 1 France 2 Malawi 1 Singapore 1 
Belgium 2 Gabon 1 Malaysia 1 Slovak Republic 2 
Belize 1 Germany 2 Maldives 1 Slovenia 2 
Bolivia 1 Ghana 1 Mali 1 South Africa 1 
Botswana 1 Greece 2 Malta 2 Spain 2 
Brazil 1 Guatemala 1 Mauritania 1 Sudan 1 
Brunei Darussalam 1 Guinea 1 Mauritius 1 Sweden 2 
Bulgaria 2 Honduras 1 Mexico 1 Switzerland 2 
Cambodia 1 Hong Kong 1 Mongolia 1 Syria 1 
Cameroon 1 Hungary 2 Morocco 1 Tanzania 1 
Canada 2 Iceland 2 Mozambique 1 Thailand 1 
Cape Verde 1 India 1 Namibia 1 Trinidad & Tobago 1 
Chile 1 Indonesia 1 Nepal 1 Tunisia 1 
China 1 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1 Netherlands 2 Turkey 1 
Colombia 1 Iraq 1 New Zealand 2 Uganda 1 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 Ireland 2 Nigeria 1 United Kingdom 2 
Congo, Rep. 1 Israel 2 Norway 2 United States 2 
Costa Rica 1 Italy 2 Oman 1 Uruguay 1 
Cote d'Ivoire 1 Japan 2 Pakistan 1 Venezuela, RB 1 
Cyprus 2 Jordan 1 Panama 1 Vietnam 1 
Czech Republic 2 Kenya 1 Paraguay 1 Yemen, Rep. 1 
Denmark 2 Korea, Rep. 1 Peru 1 Zambia 1 
Dominican Republic 1 Kuwait 1 Philippines 1 Zimbabwe 1 
Ecuador 1 Lao PDR 1 Poland 2 
  Note: The number “1” [“2”] indicates that the country was included in the subsample of 87 [36] 
developing [developed] countries (according to UNCTAD classification). 
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TABLE A2 
Summary Statistics on the Main Variables Used in the Analysis 
  Observations Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. 
TFP 1099 491.13 21.84 2522.40 481.53 
FDItotal 1106 5.35 –55.07 85.96 7.66 
Greenfield  1047 8.12 0.0001 355.13 19.37 
M&A 797 1.21 –14.22 82.28 4.26 
 
